Housing Prices Pick Up in California As the biggest residential property market in the United States, California often serves as a bellwether for the nation's economic health. And new research from that state suggests that housing prices nationally could start to rebound relatively soon.The latest data, including two consecutive monthly gains in the median price of existing homes, has some industry officials hopeful that the state housing market has finally reached a bottom and is poised to recover from a prolonged period of declining residential values. In April, California's single-family median home price rose 1.4 percent to $256,700. While that is still off by more than 36 percent from April 2008, the 540,360 homes sales on a seasonally adjusted annual basis reflect an increase of almost 50 percent over the same period, according to the state’s REALTORS® group.
Thank You For Making Us Diamond Certified.....
Saturday, May 30, 2009
Thursday, May 28, 2009
1972
According the MBA’s National Delinquency Survey, the delinquency rate for mortgage loans on one-to-four-unit residential properties was 8.22 percent on a non-seasonally adjusted basis, down 41 basis points from 8.63 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008. Delinquency rates always decline in the first quarter of the year due to a variety of seasonal factors. After accounting for these factors, the seasonally adjusted delinquency rate was 9.12 percent of all loans outstanding as of the end of the first quarter of 2009, up 124 basis points from the fourth quarter of 2008, and up 277 basis points from one year ago. The seasonally adjusted rate is the highest in the MBA’s records going back to 1972 and the unadjusted rate is the highest recorded in the first quarter of any year back to 1972. The delinquency rate includes loans that are at least one payment past due but does not include loans in the process of foreclosure. The percentage of loans in the foreclosure process at the end of the first quarter was 3.85 percent, an increase of 55 basis points from the fourth quarter of 2008 and up 138 basis points from one year ago. Both the foreclosure inventory percentage and the quarter to quarter increase are record highs.
The combined percentage of loans in foreclosure and at least one payment past due, meaning the percentage of mortgage holders not current on their mortgages, was 12.07 percent on a non-seasonally adjusted basis, the highest ever recorded in the MBA delinquency survey.
“The increase in the foreclosure number is sobering but not unexpected. The rate of foreclosure starts remained essentially flat for the last three quarters of 2008 and we suspected that the numbers were artificially low due to various state and local moratoria, the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac halt on foreclosures, and various company-level moratoria,” said Jay Brinkmann, MBA’s chief economist. “Now that the guidelines of the administration’s loan modification programs are known, combined with the large number of vacant homes with past due mortgages, the pace of foreclosures has stepped up considerably.”
“In looking at these numbers, it is important to focus on what has changed as well what continue to be the key drivers of foreclosures. What has changed is the shifting of the problem somewhat away from the subprime and option ARM/Alt-A loans to the prime fixed-rate loans. The foreclosure rate on prime fixed-rate loans has doubled in the last year, and, for the first time since the rapid growth of subprime lending, prime fixed-rate loans now represent the largest share of new foreclosures. In addition, almost half of the overall increase in foreclosure starts we saw in the first quarter was due to the increase in prime fixed-rate loans. More than anything else, this points to the impact of the recession and drops in employment on mortgage defaults.
“What has not changed, however, is the oversized impact of California, Florida, Arizona and Nevada in driving up the national numbers. Those states continue to account for about 46 percent of the foreclosure starts in the country, and represented 56 percent of the increase in foreclosure starts, including half of the increase in prime fixed-rate foreclosure starts.
“It is difficult to overstate the severe impact home price declines have had on mortgage performance in those four states. 10.6 percent of the mortgages in Florida are now somewhere in the process of foreclosure. In Nevada it is 7.8 percent, Arizona 5.6 percent and California 5.2 percent.
“In the first three months of this year, foreclosure actions were started on 3.4 percent of the mortgages in Nevada, 2.8 percent of the mortgages in Florida, 2.5 percent of the mortgages in Arizona and 2.2 percent of the loans in California. In comparison, the states with the highest foreclosure rates in the hard hit Midwest were Michigan and Illinois at 1.5 percent and Indiana and Ohio at 1.3 percent.
“While the national foreclosure start rate was 1.37 percent in the first quarter, in California, Florida, Nevada and Arizona it was 2.45 percent. Absent those four states, the national rate would have been 1.01 percent.
“Looking forward, it does not appear the level of mortgage defaults will begin to fall until after the employment situation begins to improve. MBA’s forecast, a view now shared by the Federal Reserve and others, is that the unemployment rate will not hit its peak until mid-2010. Since changes in mortgage performance lag changes in the level of employment, it is unlikely we will see much of an improvement until after that,” said Brinkmann.
Change from last quarter (fourth quarter of 2008)
The seasonally adjusted delinquency rate increased 100 basis points to 6.06 percent for prime loans, increased 307 basis points to 24.95 percent for subprime loans, increased 11 basis points to 13.84 percent for FHA loans, and increased 69 basis points to 8.21 percent for VA loans. Seasonally adjusted rates should be viewed with a degree of caution because the statistical models behind the adjustments were estimated based on a much more benign environment. Since the current levels of delinquencies are far outside the range of most of the values used to build the models, the seasonally adjusted numbers may considerably overestimate or even underestimate the true long-term trends.
The percentage of loans in the foreclosure process increased 61 basis points to 2.49 percent for prime loans, and increased 63 basis points for subprime loans to 14.34 percent. FHA loans saw a 33 basis point increase in the foreclosure inventory rate to 2.76 percent, while the foreclosure inventory rate for VA loans increased 27 basis points to 1.93 percent.
The non-seasonally adjusted foreclosure starts rate increased 26 basis points to 0.94 percent for prime loans and increased 69 basis points for subprime loans to 4.65 percent. The rate increased 15 basis points for FHA loans to 1.10 percent and increased seven basis points for VA loans to 0.72 percent.
The seriously delinquent rate, the non-seasonally adjusted percentage of loans that are 90 days or more delinquent, or in the process of foreclosure, was up from both last quarter and from last year. This measure is designed to account for inter-company differences on when a loan enters the foreclosure process.
Compared with last quarter, the seriously delinquent rate increased for all loan types. The rate increased 96 basis points for prime loans to 4.70 percent, increased 177 basis points for subprime loans to 24.88 percent, increased 39 basis points for FHA loans to 7.37 percent, and increased 30 basis points for VA loans percent to 4.42 percent.
Change from last year (first quarter of 2008)
On a year-over-year basis, the seasonally adjusted delinquency rate increased for all loan types. The delinquency rate increased 235 basis points for prime loans, increased 616 basis points for subprime loans, increased 112 basis points for FHA loans, and increased 99 basis points for VA loans.
The percentage of loans in the foreclosure process increased 127 basis points for prime loans and 360 basis points for subprime loans. The rate increased 36 basis points for FHA loans and 69 basis points for VA loans.
The non-seasonally adjusted foreclosure starts rate increased 39 basis points for prime loans, 57 basis points for subprime loans, 14 basis points for FHA loans, and 21 basis points for VA loans.
The seriously delinquent rate was 271 basis points higher for prime loans and 846 basis points higher for subprime loans. The rate also increased 178 basis points for FHA loans and 154 basis points for VA loans.
Saturday, May 23, 2009
Have A Great Memorial Day
The first kick I took was when I hit the ground
You end up like a dog thats been beat too much
Till you spend half your life just covering up
Born in the u.s.a.,
[I] was born in the u.s.a.
[I] was born in the u.s.a., born in the u.s.a.
Got in a little hometown jam
So they put a rifle in my handSent me off to a foreign land
To go and kill the yellow man
Born in the u.s..a....
Come back home to the refineryHiring man
said son if it was up to me
Went down to see my v.a. man
He said son, dont you understand
I had a brother at khe sahn
Fighting off the viet cong
Theyre still there, hes all gone
He had a woman he loved in saigon
I got a picture of him in her arms
nowDown in the shadow of the penitentiary
Out by the gas fires of the refineryIm ten years burning down the road
Nowhere to run aint got nowhere to go
Born in the u.s.a.,
[ I ]was born in the u.s.a.Born in the u.s.a.,
Im a long gone daddy in the u.s.a.B
orn in the u.s.a., born in the u.s.a.Born in the u.s.a.,
Im a cool rocking daddy in the u.s.a.
"Born in the U.S.A." is a 1984 song written and performed by Bruce Springsteen. Taken from the album of the same name, it is one of his best-known singles. Rolling Stone ranked the song 275th on their list of the 500 Greatest Songs of All Time. In 2001, the RIAA's Songs of the Century placed the song 59th (out of 365). Lyrically, the song deals with the effects of the Vietnam War on Americans although it is widely misinterpreted as a patriotic anthem.
Friday, May 22, 2009
At this time....? - Whatever happen to - ALL THE TIME?
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's Mortgagee Review Board today announced actions against more than 120 lenders for violating FHA requirements. Violations range from failure to conduct sufficient quality control, to failure to continue to meet FHA recertification requirements, to falsifying loan documents.
The entire list of Board actions is posted as a Notice in the Federal Register and may be accessed through the HUD website.
Yesterday, President Barack Obama signed the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act that grants FHA more authority to keep bad actors out of the FHA programs and provided additional enforcement tools to police those lenders who employ false or misleading marketing tactics (see attached). Meanwhile, the Administration's FY 2010 budget proposal seeks additional investments in FHA to curb fraud and abuse including enhanced investments in technology, staffing and training to enable FHA to cope with the rising volume of mortgage business, detect fraud, and monitor the practices of lenders and appraisers.
"At this time [?] of uncertainty in the mortgage market, FHA needs to be especially vigilant in making sure that its approved lenders meet the highest standards of conduct," said HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan. "We expect, and more importantly American homebuyers deserve, that when they deal with an FHA-approved lender, they're dealing with a lender they can trust. "The provisions in the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act will expand our enforcement and help keep bad actors out of our program."
Sanctions the Board may impose include issuing letters of reprimand, suspension of FHA lending approval, probation, withdrawal of FHA approval, and payment of civil money penalties. Among the actions announced today, 102 lenders had their FHA approval withdrawn, five lenders agreed to make indemnification payments to FHA totaling more than $500,000, and 24 lenders were accessed fines or administrative costs totaling more than $1.2 million.
HUD's actions resulted from standard compliance reviews of FHA-approved lenders. HUD's four Home Ownership Centers - in Atlanta, Denver, Philadelphia and Santa Ana, California - conduct a majority of the reviews. The most serious violations of FHA requirements are referred to the Mortgagee Review Board. Board actions are reported quarterly in the Federal Register.
The lenders noted below had their FHA approval withdrawn and were assessed substantial civil money penalties:
Gatewood Mortgage Corporation, Houston, TX
Gatewood Mortgage Corporation (Gatewood) is a Direct Endorsement lender. This matter came before the Board as a result of multiple violations including the submission of false information and documentation, and violations of FHA approval and underwriting requirements.
Among other things, the Board found that Gatewood submitted false information with respect to its initial approval application, Yearly Reverification Report and multiple notifications to HUD. Gatewood also used the identity of individuals without their knowledge. Further, Gatewood submitted financial statements to HUD that were falsified and not audited by a licensed certified public accountant. Gatewood also violated HUD eligibility requirements by employing and retaining a debarred individual as an employee. Gatewood improperly permitted third parties to originate FHA insured mortgage loans. Finally, Gatewood failed to provide proper documentation in connection with the source of funds required for closing. Based upon the numerous and serious violations of HUD requirements and the submission of false information to the Department, Gatewood's FHA approval was permanently withdrawn on January 16, 2009, and a Civil Money Penalty of $492,500 was imposed.
Hogar Mortgage and Financial Services, Inc., Montvale, NJ
Hogar Mortgage and Financial Services, Inc., (Hogar) is a Direct Endorsement lender. In this case, the Board determined that Hogar committed serious violations of HUD underwriting requirements. Specifically, it found that Hogar failed to resolve discrepancies and conflicting information when originating loans and/or obtaining mortgage insurance; failed to document the source and/or adequacy of funds for the downpayment, closing costs and/or cash reserves; and failed to maintain and implement a Quality Control Plan in compliance with HUD/FHA requirements. Based upon the seriousness of the violations and the lender's response, Hogar's FHA approval was withdrawn on January 27, 2009, for five years and a civil money penalty was imposed in the amount of $151,500.
HUD's Mortgagee Review Board was established in 1989 and exercises all of the functions of the Secretary with respect to administrative actions against lenders. The Board is the only entity in the Department that has the authority to impose civil money penalties and administrative sanctions against HUD/FHA-approved lenders who knowingly and materially violate HUD/FHA program statutes, regulations and handbook requirements. The Board also acts to enforce the provisions of the Fair Housing Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and Executive Order 11063, as they apply to the origination and servicing of HUD/FHA-insured single family and multifamily mortgages and loans.
The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act contains numerous provisions that help FHA better ensure that predatory lending entities and individuals are not allowed to participate in the FHA home mortgage insurance program. Specifically, the Act would:
Require HUD approval of all parties participating in the FHA single family mortgage origination process.
Allow HUD to impose a civil money penalty against loan originators who are not HUD-approved and yet participate in FHA mortgage originations.
Make clear that an applicant is ineligible for approval if the entity or any officer, partner, director, principal, or employee of the entity is: a) suspended or debarred by any Federal agency; b) under indictment for, or has been convicted of, an offense that reflects adversely upon the applicant's integrity, competence or fitness to meet the responsibilities of an approved mortgagee; c) subject to unresolved findings contained in a HUD or other governmental audit, investigation, or review; d) engaged in business practices that do not conform to generally accepted practices of prudent mortgagees; e) convicted of a felony related to participation in the real estate or mortgage loan industry; or f) in violation of provisions of the S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act.
Require that HUD receives notice of the debarment and any change in licensing status of a FHA-approved mortgagee.
Require HUD to expand the existing FHA process of reviewing new applicants for FHA approval for the purpose of identifying those representing a high risk to the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund and implement procedures that expand the number of loans reviewed by FHA for lenders approved within the last 12 months, and include a process for random reviews that is based on loan volume by newly approved participants.
Require FHA-approved mortgagees to use their HUD registered company names in all advertizing and to keep copies of all advertisements. FHA has witnessed a significant increase in deceptive advertising practices over the last 18 months. This provision will provide for better oversight of the advertising practices of approved lenders by requiring that the lenders use the same corporate name as is on file with FHA.
Require HUD approval of all parties participating in the FHA single family mortgage origination process.
Allow HUD to impose a civil money penalty against loan originators who are not HUD-approved and yet participate in FHA mortgage originations.
Make clear that an applicant is ineligible for approval if the entity or any officer, partner, director, principal, or employee of the entity is: a) suspended or debarred by any Federal agency; b) under indictment for, or has been convicted of, an offense that reflects adversely upon the applicant's integrity, competence or fitness to meet the responsibilities of an approved mortgagee; c) subject to unresolved findings contained in a HUD or other governmental audit, investigation, or review; d) engaged in business practices that do not conform to generally accepted practices of prudent mortgagees; e) convicted of a felony related to participation in the real estate or mortgage loan industry; or f) in violation of provisions of the S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act.
Require that HUD receives notice of the debarment and any change in licensing status of a FHA-approved mortgagee.
Require HUD to expand the existing FHA process of reviewing new applicants for FHA approval for the purpose of identifying those representing a high risk to the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund and implement procedures that expand the number of loans reviewed by FHA for lenders approved within the last 12 months, and include a process for random reviews that is based on loan volume by newly approved participants.
Require FHA-approved mortgagees to use their HUD registered company names in all advertizing and to keep copies of all advertisements. FHA has witnessed a significant increase in deceptive advertising practices over the last 18 months. This provision will provide for better oversight of the advertising practices of approved lenders by requiring that the lenders use the same corporate name as is on file with FHA.
Thursday, May 7, 2009
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
The April 2009 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey
In the April survey, the net percentages of respondents that reported having tightened their business lending policies over the previous three months, although continuing to be very elevated, edged down for the second consecutive survey. In contrast, somewhat larger net percentages of domestic banks than in the January survey reported having tightened credit standards on residential mortgages. The net percentage of domestic respondents that reported having tightened their lending policies on credit card loans remained about unchanged from the January survey, whereas the net percentage that reported having tightened their policies on other consumer loans fell. Respondents indicated that demand for loans from both businesses and households continued to weaken for nearly all types of loans over the survey period, an exception being demand for prime mortgages, a category of loans that registered an increase in demand for the first time since the survey began to track prime mortgages separately in April 2007.
In response to the special questions on the outlook for loan quality, a significant majority of banks reported that credit quality for all types of loans is likely to deteriorate over the year if the economy progresses according to consensus forecasts. In response to the special questions on international trade finance, the majority of domestic institutions that provide such credit and a substantial fraction of foreign institutions reported having tightened standards over the previous six months.
Questions on Lending to Businesses
(Table 1, questions 1-8; Table 2, questions 1-8)
Commercial and industrial lending. On net, about 40 percent of domestic respondents, compared with around 65 percent in the January survey, reported having tightened their credit standards on commercial and industrial (C&I) loans to firms of all sizes over the previous three months. On balance, domestic banks have reported tightening their credit standards on C&I loans to large and middle-market firms for eight consecutive surveys and to small firms for ten consecutive surveys. Although 40 percent is still very elevated, the April survey marks the first time since January 2008 that the proportion of banks reporting such tightening fell below 50 percent. Similarly, the net percentages of domestic respondents that reported tightening various terms on C&I loans over the previous three months remained elevated but were slightly lower than those reported in the January survey. Specifically, about 80 percent of domestic banks, on balance, indicated that they had increased spreads of loan rates over their cost of funds for C&I loans to large and middle-market firms, compared with around 95 percent in January. About 75 percent of domestic respondents, compared with about 90 percent in January, indicated that they had increased such spreads for C&I loans to small firms. A significant majority of banks reported having charged higher premiums on riskier loans and having increased the costs of credit lines over the survey period.
U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks also tightened their business lending stance further over the previous three months. On net, about 30 percent of foreign banks, compared with 65 percent in Janaury, reported tightening credit standards for C&I loans. As with their domestic counterparts, significant percentages of foreign banks further tightened various terms on C&I loans, although these percentages were somewhat lower than those in January. On balance, over 65 percent of foreign respondents reported an increase in premiums charged on riskier loans and in the cost of credit lines, and about 60 percent of foreign banks reported an increase in spreads of loan rates over their cost of funds.
Large majorities of both domestic and foreign banks reported a less favorable or more uncertain economic outlook, a worsening of industry-specific problems, and a reduced tolerance for risk as important reasons for tightening credit standards and terms on C&I loans. A substantial majority of foreign respondents also indicated that an increase in defaults by borrowers in public debt markets, decreased liquidity in the secondary market for business loans, and deterioration in their banks' expected capital position were important reasons for the change in C&I lending policies over the survey period.
On balance, about 60 percent of domestic banks reported a further weakening of demand for C&I loans from firms of all sizes over the previous three months, a proportion similar to that reported in the January survey. In contrast, foreign banks, on net, saw little change in demand over the survey period, compared with about 25 percent that reported weaker demand in the January survey.
All foreign respondents and 37 of the 38 domestic banks that saw weaker demand for C&I loans over the previous three months indicated that a decrease in their customers' needs to finance investment in plant or equipment was an important reason for the change in loan demand. Substantial majorities of the domestic institutions that had experienced such weaker demand also pointed to decreases in their customers' needs to finance inventories, accounts receivable, and mergers and acquisitions. In addition, about 35 percent of domestic respondents, on net, reported that inquiries from potential business borrowers had decreased during the survey period, a percentage similar to that in the January survey. In contrast, only about 5 percent of foreign respondents, on net, reported a decrease in such inquiries.
Commercial real estate lending. About 65 percent of domestic banks, on net, reported tightening their lending standards on commercial real estate (CRE) loans over the previous three months, compared with about 80 percent in the January survey. On balance, domestic banks have been tightening credit standards on CRE loans for 14 consecutive surveys, and the April survey marks the first time since October 2007 that the net proportion of banks reporting such tightening fell below 70 percent. About 35 percent of foreign branches and agencies also reported tightening their lending standards on CRE loans over the survey period. The demand for CRE loans weakened further at survey respondents over the previous three months. About 65 percent of domestic banks, on balance, reported weaker demand for CRE loans, the highest net percentage so reporting since the survey began tracking demand for CRE loans in April 1995. In contrast, the net proportion of foreign banks that reported a decrease in demand for CRE loans--about 35 percent--was somewhat smaller than that in the January survey.
Questions on Lending to Households
(Table 1, questions 9-18)
Residential real estate lending. In the April survey, somewhat larger fractions of domestic respondents than in the January survey reported having tightened their lending standards on prime and nontraditional residential mortgages. About 50 percent of domestic respondents indicated that they had tightened their lending standards on prime mortgages over the previous three months, and about 65 percent of the 25 banks that originated nontraditional residential mortgage loans over the survey period reported having tightened their lending standards on such loans. About 35 percent of domestic respondents saw stronger demand, on net, for prime residential mortgage loans over the previous three months, a substantial change from the roughly 10 percent that reported weaker demand in the January survey. About 10 percent of respondents reported having experienced weaker demand for nontraditional mortgage loans over the previous three months-a substantially lower proportion than in the January survey. Only two banks reported making subprime mortgage loans over the same period.
On net, about 50 percent of domestic respondents, down from roughly 60 percent in the January survey noted that they had tightened their lending standards for approving applications for revolving home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) over the previous three months. Regarding demand, about 30 percent of domestic banks, on net, reported weaker demand for HELOCs over the previous three months, slightly more than the proportion that had reported weaker demand in the January survey.
Consumer lending. Large percentages of domestic banks again reported a tightening of standards and terms on both credit card loans and other consumer loans over the previous three months. Nearly 60 percent of respondents indicated that they had tightened lending standards on credit card loans, about the same proportion as in the January survey. About 50 percent of respondents, down from 60 percent in the January survey, reported tightening standards on other consumer loans. About 50 percent of respondents reported having reduced the extent to which credit card accounts were granted to customers who did not meet their bank's credit-scoring thresholds, and a similar fraction reported pulling back from granting other kinds of consumer loans to such customers. Roughly 55 percent of the respondents, a somewhat higher proportion than in the January survey, reported having raised minimum required credit scores on credit card accounts over the previous three months. About 45 percent of respondents reported having raised minimum scores on consumer loans other than credit cards, and about 65 percent of banks, compared with 45 percent in the January survey, indicated that they had lowered credit limits to either new or existing credit card customers. In contrast to the substantial net tightening reported for consumer loan standards and terms, only about 5 percent of domestic banks, on net, indicated that they had become less willing to make consumer installment loans over the previous three months; this proportion is down from 15 percent in the January survey and 45 percent late last year. Regarding demand, about 20 percent of respondents, on net, indicated that they had experienced weaker demand for consumer loans of all types over the previous three months-substantially less that the percentage so reporting in the January survey.
Thursday, April 16, 2009
California Dreamin' + Public Integrity
The median price paid for a home last month was $223,000, down 0.4 percent from $224,000 in February, and down 37.7 percent from $358,000 for March a year ago. Around half the drop in median is due to depreciation, the other half due to shifts in the types of homes selling.
Of the existing homes sold last month, 57.4 percent were properties that had been foreclosed on. A year ago it was 35.5 percent.
The typical mortgage payment that home buyers committed themselves to paying last month was $958. That was down from $976 in February, and down from $1,712 for March a year ago. Adjusted for inflation, last month's mortgage payment was the lowest in DataQuick's statistics, which go back to 1988. The payment was 54.4 percent below the spring 1989 peak of the prior real estate cycle. It was 63.1 percent below the current cycle's peak in June 2006.
MDA DataQuick is a division of MDA Lending Solutions, a subsidiary of Vancouver-based MacDonald Dettwiler and Associates. MDA DataQuick monitors real estate activity nationwide and provides information to consumers, educational institutions, public agencies, lending institutions, title companies and industry analysts.
Indicators of market distress continue to move in different directions. Foreclosure activity is nearing its 2008 peak, while financing with adjustable-rate mortgages is at an all-time low, as is financing with multiple mortgages. Down payment sizes and flipping rates are stable, and non-owner occupied buying activity is above-average in some markets, MDA DataQuick reported.
In 2004, years before plummeting real estate values turned Fort Myers, Florida, into a top five foreclosure capital, appraiser Mike Tipton faced a dilemma.
Tipton’s employer, eAppraiseIT, sent him to value a two-bedroom home in a new subdivision built by the developer D.R. Horton. Paperwork givBut after inspecting the home and comparing it to five similar houses that had recently sold, Tipton set the value at $237,000, $8,000 less than the estimate. He knew the difference might disappoint DHI Mortgage, the prospective buyer’s lender, which is a subsidiary of developer D.R. Horton. And indeed it did.
The lender, in a process appraisers say was common in the boom days before the housing bubble burst, asked Tipton to redo the appraisal. It sent paperwork through eAppraiseIT asking him to reconsider the value. It gave him different homes to use for comparisonsen by the appraisal
management company to Tipton included a $245,000 estimated value.
“If you read between the lines, they wanted a larger value,” Tipton said. “I told them no, I wasn’t changing my report.”
Tipton, who like many other appraisers is paid by the job, says he was never given another appraisal for a D.R. Horton home. “All I can say is D.R. Horton has remained an active developer in Lee County,” Tipton said. “I didn’t see any further appraisals for DHI Mortgage. So you tell me.”
Carrie Gaska, a spokeswoman for First American eAppraiseIT, declined to comment on why Tipton received no further orders from the company for DHI Mortgage properties.
Tipton is among dozens of appraisers who have told the Center for Public Integrity that for years lenders across the United States have pushed them into inflating the value of homes to justify higher mortgages. Appraisers and lenders alike are demanding better oversight of the industry. In addition, the Center has obtained copies of lenders’ “blacklists” containing the names of thousands of appraisers; some appraisers say lenders used those lists to exclude those who refused to inflate home values.
The Center also found many appraisers who say they bowed to lender pressure to “hit the numbers” in order to remain in business. These appraisers, along with the lenders who pressured them, helped pump air into the housing bubble that led to widespread economic devastation, according to dozens of appraisers, lenders, and others with intimate knowledge of home loan practices.
And there’s evidence that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two largest purchasers of home loans, bought mortgages without ensuring they were made with accurate appraisals, according to an investigation by New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo.
No one knows exactly how much of a role inflated appraisals played in the mortgage meltdown. But as an increasing number of homeowners face foreclosure, many remain unaware that the appraisal they paid for during the purchase process may not have reflected the true value of their investment, and may have allowed them to borrow more money than their home was worth.
Depending on the state where the homeowners purchased, the scheme may or may not have been against the law. Pressuring an appraiser to inflate the value of a property is a crime in at least 20 states and the District of Columbia, though it is often a misdemeanor punishable by a fine, a slap on the wrist that appraisers say does little to prevent the exertion of undue pressure.
There is rampant corruption throughout the industry,” said George Dodd, a veteran appraiser in Virginia who has been advocating for more regulation. “The way it stands now, the public doesn’t stand a chance.”
Dodd said, that in addition to the appraisal ordered by the lender, consumers can protect themselves by ordering a second independent appraisal before a purchase. They will, however, still have to pay for the lender’s appraisal.
Fudging the Numbers
Richard Frank, an appraiser in Vero Beach, Florida, started appraising homes in 1998, when values were climbing. From the beginning, Frank said he stepped into a business arrangement in which lenders forced appraisers to abandon their standards if they wanted work.
Frank said lenders commonly gave appraisers an estimated value for a home on each appraisal order. Appraisers, who usually determine values by comparing homes to recent sales of comparable properties, often worked backwards from that estimated price to find recent real estate sales that would “make the value,” he said. Working backwards from the estimate was faster. Everyone made money. And since appraising homes is subjective — both an art and a science — it was easy to fudge numbers.
“The [supposedly comparable] houses might be bigger and better, but who’s going to know?” Franks said. “In an increasing market, your sins are buried.”
If an appraisal came in lower than the purchase price, the loan likely would be denied. Since loan origination staff is typically paid by commission, a failed deal meant no paycheck for them. If that happened too many times, Frank says, lenders stopped sending the appraiser work. “Put out, and you will get more dates. It’s just that simple,” he said.
Richard Bitner, a former subprime lender in Texas who has written an insider account of the mortgage industry collapse, backs up Frank’s story. Bitner says the pressure came more from the cozy relationship between lenders and appraisers than threats.
“The pressure applied didn’t really need to be overt,” Bitner said. “If suddenly [an appraiser] can’t make the values, at the end of the day, it’s pretty easy to go to someone else. You are here to make money.”
Appraisers say lenders did just that, sometimes asking appraisers to promise a value before they officially ordered the report.
Both appraisers and lenders say the two professions have not always been at odds. Appraisers traditionally served as the front-line defense for loan underwriting departments, ensuring that the value of a home was worth the loan amount in case the lender needed to foreclose. In the past, many banks had in-house appraisal departments. And, unlike today, lenders historically kept and serviced the loan for the life of the mortgage. But when lenders began bundling loans and selling them to Wall Street and other investors, lenders carried less risk and industry analysts say they became less concerned about home values. With no “skin in the game,” lenders focused on closing deals. In this climate, many in the industry say the appraisal became a barrier to jump over.
Appraisers say making money was easy, as long as they did not cross lenders. But if they did, appraisers say lenders lashed out, adding their names to the blacklists that lenders originally kept to identify incompetent appraisers. Lenders kept their own lists, but appraisers sometimes found their names on those lists even if they never worked for that lender.
Amerisave, one of the largest online mortgage lenders, has close to 12,000 appraisers on its “ineligible appraiser list,” which was removed from the Atlanta-based company’s website after the Center made inquiries about it. In December, appraiser Tom Woolford found his name on Amerisave’s list when the list also appeared on a popular online appraisal industry forum. Woolford said he has never done an appraisal for Amerisave, and the address they used for him was at least 10 years old. He doesn’t know how he ended up on the list, but he says it could be a matter of reputation: He says he never gives in to lender pressure.
“I think you will find a lot of the people on these lists do not hit numbers,” Woolford said. “I won’t lie, and I won’t push a number for nobody.”
After conferring with top management officials, Martin Wilhelm, an Amerisave vice president, declined to answer questions about how it compiles its blacklist.
Unheard Warning Bells
Before real estate prices began to plummet in 2006, some sounded the alarm on fraudulent appraisals and lender pressure, but few listened to the warnings, least of all Congress, industry regulators, and the Justice Department.
David Callahan, a founder of the public policy think tank Demos, was one of the first people to study inflated appraisals and lender pressure. In 2005, Callahan wrote a paper describing the financial incentives for lenders and appraisers to pursue inflated appraisals. The goal of lenders, brokers, real estate agents and developers was to ensure that a home loan closed without a problem, Callahan said. All those people exert pressure on appraisers to inflate values.
In a 2007 study by October Research, a real estate news provider, 90 percent of more than 1,200 appraisers polled reported feeling pressure to change property values, usually from lenders, mortgage brokers or real estate agents.
“Congress didn’t really care about it,” Callahan said, noting the lack of reaction his report generated in Washington. “There was remarkably little legislative activity looking at the corruption in the real estate market.”
In fact, Congress had struggled with the issue of lender pressure on appraisers since the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. In recent years, Congressman Paul Kanjorski, a Pennsylvania Democrat, has been the most vocal proponent for stronger regulation, proposing legislation in 2007 that would have set stiffer appraisal independence standards. The legislation, which would have prohibited lender coercion of appraisers and established penalties for it, was folded into the 2007 Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act. The legislation faced stiff opposition and lobbying by the banking and mortgage industry, which argued it would adversely impact credit availability, and the bill was not taken up in the Senate after passing the House. In March, the legislation was reintroduced in the House as part of the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act.
Appraisal industry insiders say part of the difficulty in policing the process stems from regulatory fragmentation. Appraisers fall under the jurisdiction of state regulators, which enforce standards set up by the Appraisal Foundation, a nonprofit industry group authorized by Congress. State licensing is overseen by the Appraisal Subcommittee, an agency created by Congress in 1989.
Hyped appraisals did not escape the attention of federal banking and savings and loan regulators, but reports published since the mortgage industry collapse show that those officials did little to stop the practice. A February audit by the Treasury Inspector General on the implosion of IndyMac, a savings and loan, noted that the Office of Thrift Supervision, IndyMac’s primary regulator, identified problems with appraisals on the company’s loans in 2001, but took no formal action.
In one example from the audit report, an IndyMac file for a $1.5 million loan contained appraisals ranging from $639,000 to $1.5 million. “There was no support to show why the higher value appraisal was the appropriate one to use for approving the loan,” the report says.
In 2006, Ameriquest, then the largest subprime lender in the country, paid $325 million and agreed to reform its business practices to settle a 49-state investigation into its predatory lending practices. Among the allegations, the lawsuit claimed Ameriquest engaged in deceptive or misleading practices to obtain inflated appraisals substantially beyond the market values of homes. The company, which closed in 2007, denied the allegations.
Problems like these only seem to come to light during declining markets and concerns are put on a shelf when buyers return, says Dave Biggers, founder and CEO of the real estate technology company a la mode, inc. In an appreciating market, appraisals five to 10 percent beyond value are not an issue, he said, and home values climb beyond appraisal values soon after the sale.
But when the market peaked in 2005 and then began its sharp decline, inflated appraisals exacerbated the trouble faced by “underwater” homeowners. “We as the taxpayers are getting stuck with the bill,” Biggers said. “What has not been investigated is the systemic issues that take place on the basis of policy by many of these companies.”
“Who Has Juice with Whom”
Since the bubble burst, the FBI has focused most of its real estate efforts on appraisers and other fraudsters who developed intricate schemes to defraud banks. The Justice Department is not going through the wreckage looking at the institutionalized lender pressure on the appraisal process. An FBI official, asking not to be identified because the agency has no official position on the matter, said they view the matter as a regulatory issue to be addressed by Congress not a matter of law enforcement.
FBI Deputy Director John S. Pistole testified in March before the House Committee on Financial Services about the agency’s efforts to combat mortgage fraud, saying the bureau is focusing its limited white collar crime-fighting resources on real estate industry insiders engaged in fraud for profit. Those cases target real estate speculators and mortgage brokers who work with appraisers to sell a house for far more than its true value. So far, however, there have been no prosecutions of lenders who pressured appraisers to inflate values.
Instead, the highest-profile investigation of the appraisal industry has come from New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo. In 2007, Cuomo filed a lawsuit against First American Corp. and its subsidiary First American eAppraiseIT, charging that eAppraiseIT allowed loan production staff at Washington Mutual to pressure appraisers to inflate home values. The suit is pending.
The suit claims the appraisal management company allowed Washington Mutual’s “loan production staff to hand-pick appraisers who bring in appraisal values high enough to permit WaMu’s loans to close, and improperly permits WaMu to pressure eAppraiseIT appraisers to change values that are too low to permit loans to close.”
In addition, the complaint alleges that executives at eAppraiseIt knew its appraisal arrangement with Washington Mutual broke the law. “I think WaMu’s new initiative is way over the line,” it quotes eAppraiseIT’s executive vice president as writing in spring of 2007 to the company’s president. “It is even possible that the current arrangement crosses the line.”
“Bingo!” replied the company president, according to the complaint. “It boils down to who has juice with whom at the regulatory level.”
In a 2007 press release, First American said the New York lawsuit “has no foundation in fact or law. The Attorney General’s allegations, largely based on a handful of e-mails that have been taken out of context, or mischaracterized, and an incomplete review of the facts, belie our record of compliance with applicable law.”
Cuomo also subpoenaed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The investigation into whether the two largest loan purchasers bought loans that included inflated appraisals was dropped in March 2008 after Fannie and Freddie agreed to strict new rules — penned in part by Cuomo’s office — governing the appraisal practices for the loans they buy. They also agreed to pay $24 million to fund the Independent Valuation Protection Institute, a new organization to help implement and monitor the code.
What led Fannie and Freddie to the agreement was not made public, and Cuomo’s investigators aren’t talking, but his office did point the Center for Public Integrity to letters Cuomo sent in 2007 to the CEOs of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, expanding his investigation to include a subpoena of their records.
In the letters, Cuomo wrote that his office had “uncovered a pattern of collusion between lenders and appraisers that has resulted in widespread inflation of the valuations of homes.” Further, Cuomo wrote that evidence shows mortgages Fannie and Freddie purchased from Washington Mutual “may be premised on fraudulently inflated appraisals” that do not meet regulatory standards. “We are, therefore, expanding our investigation to determine the extent of [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s] knowledge of, and actions regarding, these problems as they relate to past mortgage purchases and securitizations.”
Cuomo’s office declined the Center’s request for details of its investigation’s findings.
The Home Valuation Code of Conduct, an industry standard which came about as a result of Cuomo’s investigation, is slated to go into effect on May 1, makes deep changes to the appraisal industry.
The code, which affects all loans eligible for purchase by Fannie and Freddie, bans lenders and brokers from pressuring appraisers to hype appraisals by threatening to withhold future business as punishment. Lenders must inform appraisers when they are removed from qualified use lists and allow them to appeal. It also bans loan origination staff from ordering appraisals directly — instead, the lender must use other in-house staff or go through a middleman appraisal management company. Even so, the incentive to pressure appraisers still exists, even for supposedly independent appraisal management companies.
Fox and the Hen House
Despite the changes, the new code has been panned by both the appraisal industry and some lenders. The National Association of Mortgage Brokers filed a lawsuit to try to block the rules, arguing that the code puts smaller mortgage brokerages at a disadvantage because they will be forced to rely on lenders to obtain appraisals for their customers, thereby limiting their ability to shop for loans. The association dropped the action earlier this month.
Appraisers who work for themselves or small businesses say the code will end their careers since mortgage brokers and other loan generation staff can no longer contact them directly. Instead, they say the code in effect directs all business to appraisal management companies, the unregulated middlemen that are often subsidiaries of lenders.
Appraisers say the management companies passed on pressure from lenders in the past, including in Cuomo’s case against eAppraiseIt, and see nothing in the new code to stop it from happening.
“It’s a bit of irony that the solution is the same thing that got us here,” said Bill Garber, director of government and external relations at the Appraisal Institute, a trade association representing appraisers.
The Home Valuation Code of Conduct, Garber added, is lip service to cleaning up the industry. Appraisal management companies “are just as capable of pressuring appraisers as anyone else.”
Appraisers also dislike the plan because some appraisal management companies take a hefty administrative fee and pay low rates to appraisers, which experienced appraisers say will force them out of the business and turn the industry over to less experienced appraisers who are more likely to make mistakes.
Pressure will still come from the management companies, said Dodd, the Virginia appraiser. “They could give a damn about the consumer. They don’t care if the consumer pays ten, twenty, or thirty thousand more than it’s worth.”
Cuomo hasn’t answered critics of the new code, and his office did not return calls from the Center for Public Integrity.
Lawyers, Banks, and Money
Since the real estate crash, the appraisal and lending industries have come under closer watch by regulators and Congress. But so far, no one has addressed the effect inflated appraisals have had on struggling homeowners. Buyers who moved in at the height of the boom are particularly vulnerable, and attorneys say their struggle provides fertile ground for civil litigation.
“I definitely believe that lenders have engaged in widespread illegal activities, and they will come under increased scrutiny in the next year or so as people who have been damaged by this realize there are some bad actors out there,” said Steve Berman, an attorney in Seattle.
In October, Berman’s firm, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro, filed a class action on behalf of blacklisted appraisers against Countrywide Financial and its subsidiary Landsafe, an appraisal management company. Like Cuomo’s suit, Berman’s case argues that Countrywide forced appraisers to hit the numbers and added them to a blacklist if they refused.
“Countrywide… has engaged in a practice of pressuring and intimidating appraisers into using appraisal techniques that meet Countrywide’s business objectives even if the use of such appraisal techniques is improper and in violation of industry standards,” the complaint alleges.
If the appraisers refused, the complaint says they were placed on a “field review list,” which disqualified them for further work for loans for Countrywide. Because mortgage brokers shop for lenders, if an appraiser was blacklisted by Countrywide, the largest independent mortgage lender, they were in effect blacklisted by much of the industry, Berman’s complaint claims.
According to the complaint, Countrywide’s blacklist contains more than 2,000 appraisers. Berman said his firm is looking at other lenders and their blacklists as it considers further litigation.
The new appraisal code and increased scrutiny of the industry seems to have had some effect. Lender pressure is not as strong, appraisers say, but it still exists. Ray Miller, an appraiser outside Madison, Wisconsin, says the pressure is moving to FHA loans and refinancing as credit for other loans remains dried up.
In January, Miller said he did an appraisal for a lake home where the owner was looking to refinance. The original appraisal, done when the owner bought the home a few years back, listed the value at $554,000, but the comparables used to hit that number were from homes on a more upscale lake, Miller concluded.
Miller’s reappraisal came in at $400,000. “I’m just waiting for the phone call,” he said.
In February, Miller received a call from a different lender. This one wanted him to remove pictures of a cracked sidewalk he included in his appraisal. This would be prohibited under the Home Valuation Code of Conduct. But Miller expects lenders will figure out a way around the rules.
“They don’t want good appraisers,” he said. “They don’t want good numbers, even now.”
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Will The Chicken Be Left In The Hen House?

The announcement following the Federal Open Market Committee meeting today in Washington spurred the biggest rally in longer-dated Treasuries in decades. Officials unanimously voted to expand the Fed’s balance sheet up to $1.15 trillion, and said they may broaden a program aimed at boosting consumer loans to include other assets, today’s statement showed.
With today’s move, the Fed has committed to buy or loan against everything from corporate debt, mortgages and consumer loans to government debt, after cutting its benchmark interest rate to zero failed to end the credit crunch. The unprecedented campaign comes after a worsening recession sent the unemployment rate up to a quarter-century high of 8.1 percent.
“The FOMC may believe the economy is nowhere near a bottom,” William Poole, former president of the St. Louis Fed, said in an interview today with Bloomberg News. “The Fed is engaging in a massive quantitative easing.”
Quantitative easing refers to using injections of funds into the economy as the main policy tool. Poole is now a senior economic adviser to Merk Investments LLC in Palo Alto, California, and a contributor to Bloomberg News.
Yields Plunge
Benchmark 10-year note yields plunged to 2.48 percent at 4:40 p.m. in New York, from 3.01 percent late yesterday, the biggest decline since records dating from 1962. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index rose 2.1 percent to 794.35 at the close.
“They wanted to shock the market and they succeeded,” said Ajay Rajadhyaksha, the head of fixed-income strategy at Barclays Capital in New York. If the Fed’s action “succeeds in driving primary mortgage rates” to about 4.25 percent to 4.5 percent, that would increase “affordability, which will in turn lead to increased housing demand.”
Central banks around the world are grappling with how to formulate policy with target interest rates near zero. The Bank of England is buying government bonds and corporate debt, the Bank of Japan is snapping up government notes and making subordinated loans to banks, and the Swiss National Bank is intervening to weaken the franc.
Chairman Ben S. Bernanke is employing strategies to stamp out the risk of deflation that he first laid out as a Fed governor in 2002, when he listed purchases of longer-dated Treasuries as an option.
Inflation Subdued
While buying government debt has, in some historical episodes, been associated with causing inflation to soar, Fed officials are confident that consumer prices will remain in check given “weak” demand.
The FOMC said today that inflation could “persist for a time” below their preferred level. A government report today showed that consumer prices, excluding food and energy costs, rose 1.8 percent in February from a year before, compared with an average rate of 2.2 percent over the past decade.
Bernanke is trying [?] to prevent the credit contraction from deepening what already may be the worst recession in 60 years. U.S. employers have eliminated 4.4 million jobs since the start of last year. Industrial production fell 1.4 percent in February, the fourth consecutive decline, while factory capacity in use hit 70.9 percent, matching the lowest level on record.
‘Gradual Resumption’
“Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in January indicates that the economy continues to contract,” the FOMC said in the statement. “The committee anticipates that policy actions to stabilize financial markets and institutions, together with fiscal and monetary stimulus, will contribute to a gradual resumption of sustainable economic growth.”
The global economy will contract this year for the first time since World War II, the World Bank predicts, forcing central banks to keep pumping money into their economies when conventional interest rates are at, or close to, zero.
The Fed has cut the benchmark rate from 5.25 percent, beginning in September 2007, as credit froze and the economy buckled. Policy makers are now focused on how to further channel money to the economy. The Fed has already committed to buying $600 billion of mortgage-backed securities and bonds sold by government-sponsored housing agencies.
Geithner Plans
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner also may unveil details in coming days on his plans to remove distressed mortgage assets from banks balance sheets. People familiar with the matter said the effort will involve expanding the Fed’s Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility to include lower-rated, illiquid assets in addition to recent, top-rated debt backed by consumer loans.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. may also get a broader role in the Obama administration’s strategy, the people said. The Treasury may make its announcement as soon as this week.
While the Fed’s actions have helped bring down mortgage rates, those costs have remained elevated relative to benchmark Treasuries. Prior to today’s meeting, the difference between rates on 30-year fixed mortgages and 10-year Treasuries was 2.1 percentage points, Bloomberg data show. That’s up from an average of 1.75 percentage points in the decade before the subprime mortgage market collapsed.
Yields on Fannie Mae’s 4.5 percent mortgage securities fell 0.27 percentage points from yesterday to 3.97 percent as of 3:30 p.m. in New York, suggesting new-loan rates may be pushed down about 0.27 percentage point, according to data complied by Bloomberg. Thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages averaged 5.03 percent as of March 12.
Types of Treasuries
The central bank will begin purchases of longer-term Treasuries “late next week” and buy the securities two to three times per week, the New York Fed, which will manage the operation, said in a statement. The transactions will be concentrated in two-year to 10-year debt the statement said; 30- year bonds underperformed 10-year notes as a result.
Through emergency loans and liquidity backstops, U.S. central bankers have expanded Fed credit to the economy by an unprecedented $1 trillion over the past year.
Banks worldwide have posted $1.2 trillion in write downs and credit losses on mortgage loans and other assets. U.S. Treasury officials will put the largest 19 banks through “stress tests” and decide whether they need more capital. The banks can raise equity privately or seek more government funds. Officials are also looking at ways to remove bad assets.
Coca-Cola Co., health insurer WellPoint Inc. and more than 30 other companies are tapping longer-term credit markets and paying down their short-term IOUs, a sign of some investor confidence.
Sunday, March 15, 2009
New FICO Credit Score for Mortgage Lenders Debuts
March 11, 2009 (Minneapolis, Minnesota and Atlanta, Georgia) — FICO (NYSE:FIC), the leading provider of analytics and decision management technology, and Equifax (NYSE: EFX), a global leader in information solutions, today introduced BEACON® Mortgage Score, a new FICO® industry score specifically designed to help mortgage lenders make the best possible risk decisions when addressing both current homeowners and those aspiring to own. Equifax plans to make the new score available in April to mortgage lenders and servicers for use in their loan servicing decisions including mortgage loan modifications.
The new score builds upon the predictive power of today’s BEACON® credit risk score which is widely used in the mortgage industry. By focusing specifically on mortgage risk performance, FICO scientists have developed a version of the BEACON score with significantly greater power for assessing mortgage repayment risk. In early validation testing, the performance of BEACON Mortgage Score was compared to that of the general risk BEACON score when predicting mortgage repayment risk specifically. The new score identified up to 25 percent more of the high-risk mortgages and home equity lines-of-credit that later became seriously delinquent. In light of today’s housing crisis, this new score can aid servicers in earlier identification of borrowers at risk, mitigating the high cost of consumers moving to foreclosure.
In business terms, these early results suggest that the use of BEACON Mortgage Score by the industry potentially can save it $1 billion in foreclosure costs and help keep an estimated 115,000 more struggling homeowners in their homes.
“One of the goals of our alliance with Equifax is to bring both companies’ assets and expertise to bear on the uncertainty facing lenders, borrowers and investors,” said Lisa Nelson, vice president of Global Scoring Solutions for FICO. “This new score is one of the first fruits of that alliance, and it couldn’t be more timely or valuable for mortgage lenders, loan servicers and the securitization industry.”
“Everyone in the mortgage industry is working hard to manage risk more effectively, which will help address the rising foreclosure rate while allowing servicers to keep their doors open to qualified new borrowers,” said Dann Adams, president of US Consumer Information Solutions for Equifax. “The BEACON Mortgage Score is an innovative solution with unprecedented visibility that will provide greater predictive strength at a time when the industry needs it most.”
To assist clients, BEACON® Mortgage Score retains the same 300-850® scoring range, minimum scoring criteria, and inquiry treatment as previous versions of the BEACON® score. However, to achieve its significant increase in predictive strength, FICO’s new scoring model assesses several additional data variables derived from Equifax consumer credit files, selected specifically to predict mortgage repayment risk. As a result, the model includes 15 additional score reason codes that help lenders understand and explain the scores
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Sandra F. Braunstein, Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs
Mortgage lending reform
Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Committee on Financial Services, U.S House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
The Board's Rules under TILA and HOEPA
The Federal Reserve has primary rulewriting responsibility for many consumer protection laws, including the Truth in Lending Act and the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, which amended TILA. TILA and HOEPA are implemented by the Board's Regulation Z. Following a series of hearings in 2006 and 2007, the Board last July used its authority under TILA and HOEPA to revise Regulation Z by issuing final rules to establish sweeping new regulatory protections for consumers in the residential mortgage market. Importantly, the Board's new rules apply to all mortgage lenders, not just depository institutions supervised by the federal banking and thrift agencies.
In response to specific problems we saw in the subprime market, some restrictions in the final rules apply only to higher-priced mortgage loans. Other provisions, however, apply to all mortgage loans secured by a consumer's principal dwelling. In addition to rules that protect consumers from unfair or abusive lending and mortgage servicing practices, the Board also adopted rules governing mortgage advertisements to ensure they provide accurate and balanced information and do not contain misleading or deceptive representations. A third component of the final rules ensures that for all types of mortgage loans, consumers receive transaction-specific cost disclosures early enough to use while shopping for credit.
It is important to note that the Board's final rules resulted from an interactive process that involved extensive research and outreach to consumer groups, industry representatives, and other government agencies at the state and federal levels. The Board held a series of public hearings on consumer protection in the mortgage market in four cities across the country during the summer of 2006. In light of the information received at the 2006 hearings and the rise in defaults that began soon after, the Board held an additional hearing in June 2007, to explore how it could use its authority under HOEPA to prevent abusive lending practices without unduly constricting credit. At the 2007 hearing, and in hearing-related public comments, the Board received input from individual consumers, lenders, mortgage brokers, state government officials, and academicians. The Board's rulemaking was also informed by the comments received in connection with the development of interagency supervisory guidance on nontraditional mortgage products issued in September 2006 and interagency guidance on subprime lending that was issued in June 2007.
In response to the proposed rules that were issued under HOEPA in December 2007, the Board received and considered approximately 4,700 comment letters that represented a broad spectrum of views. The Board also used consumer testing by conducting several dozen one-on-one interviews with a diverse group of consumers to test the effectiveness of proposed disclosures related to mortgage broker compensation. The testing results were the basis for making significant changes to the final rule. In sum, listening carefully to the commenters, collecting and analyzing data, and undertaking consumer testing, led to more effective and improved final rules.
Rules for Higher-Priced Loans
The Board's HOEPA rules add four key protections for a newly defined category of "higher-priced mortgage loans." These are defined as consumer-purpose loans secured by a consumer's principal dwelling and having an annual percentage rate (APR) that exceeds the average prime offer rate for comparable transactions published by the Board by at least 1.5 percentage points for first-lien loans, or 3.5 percentage points for subordinate lien loans. For the foreseeable future, the Board will obtain or derive average prime offer rates from Freddie Mac's Primary Mortgage Market Survey, and will publish these rates on at least a weekly basis. Based on the available data, the thresholds adopted by the Board would cover all, or virtually all, of the subprime market and a portion of the alt-A market.
Concerning the four key protections for higher-priced mortgage loans:
First, lenders are prohibited from making any higher-priced mortgage loan without regard to the borrower's ability to repay the obligation from income and assets other than the home. The rule requires the lender to take into account future, predictable changes in payments in determining repayment ability. Lenders comply, in part, by assessing repayment ability using the highest scheduled payment in the first seven years of the loan, rather than the consumer's initial monthly payment. For example, for an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) with a discounted initial interest rate that is fixed for five years, the lender determines repayment ability using the scheduled payment in the sixth and seventh years, which is based on the fully indexed rate.
Second, lenders are prohibited from making "stated income" loans and are required in each case to verify the income and assets they rely upon to determine borrowers' repayment ability. Lenders must also verify and consider the borrower's other debt obligations, such as by using a credit report. The rule is intended to ensure that creditors do not assess repayment ability using overstated incomes or understated payment obligations. The rule is sufficiently flexible to allow lenders to adapt their underwriting process to accommodate a borrower's particular circumstances, such as when the borrower is self-employed.
Third, the final rules restrict the use of prepayment penalties. Prepayment penalties can prevent borrowers from refinancing their loans to avoid monthly payment increases or if there are other reasons that their loan becomes unaffordable. Under the Board's rule, prepayment penalties are prohibited when the monthly payment can change during the initial four years after consummation. For other higher-priced loans, a prepayment penalty cannot last for more than two years.
Fourth, creditors are required to establish an escrow account for property taxes and homeowner's insurance for all first-lien mortgage loans. This addresses the concern that the lack of escrows in the subprime market increases the risk that consumers' borrowing decisions will be based on misleading low payment quotes that do not reflect the true cost of their homeownership obligations. The rule preserves some consumer choice by permitting creditors to allow consumers to opt-out of the escrow account after 12 months.
Protections for All Loans Secured by Consumers' Principal Dwelling
In addition to the rules for higher-cost loans, the Board adopted other protections that apply to all mortgage loans secured by a consumer's principal dwelling, regardless of cost. The rules prohibit lenders or brokers from coercing, influencing, or otherwise encouraging an appraiser to misstate or misrepresent the value of the property. The Board also prohibited loan servicers from engaging in certain unfair billing practices. Servicers are prohibited from failing to credit a payment to a consumer's account as of the date received. Second, the rule prohibits the "pyramiding" of late fees by prohibiting servicers from imposing a late fee on a consumer when the consumer's payment was timely and made in full but for any previously assessed late fee. In addition, the rules prohibit loan servicers from failing to provide a loan payoff statement on a timely basis after receiving a request from the consumer or any person acting on the consumer's behalf.
Based on the results of consumer testing, the Board did not adopt a proposed rule that would have prohibited a creditor from paying a mortgage broker more in compensation than the consumer agreed in advance the broker would receive. Under the proposal, brokers would have to disclose to consumers their total compensation, including any portion paid directly by a creditor as a "yield spread premium" before obtaining the consumer's written agreement. Brokers would also have to disclose that a creditor payment to the broker could influence the broker to offer the consumer loan terms that would not be in the consumer's interest or the most favorable terms the consumer could obtain.
The proposed rule was intended to limit the potential for unfairness, deception, and abuse while preserving the ability of consumers to cover their payments to brokers through rate increases. The Board also anticipated that the proposal would increase transparency and increase competition in the market for brokerage services. The withdrawal of this portion of the proposal was based on the results of the Board's one-on-one interviews with several dozen consumers which demonstrated that the proposed agreement and disclosures would confuse consumers and undermine their decisionmaking rather than improve it. The Board is continuing to explore options for addressing potential unfairness associated with originator compensation arrangements such as yield spread premiums.
Advertising Rules
Another goal of the Board's final rules is to ensure that mortgage loan advertisements do not contain misleading or deceptive representations. Thus, the Board's rules require that advertisements for both closed-end loans and home-equity lines of credit (HELOCs) provide accurate and balanced information about rates, monthly payments, and other features in a clear and conspicuous manner. In addition, the Board used its authority under HOEPA to prohibit seven deceptive or misleading advertising practices. For example, an advertisement for a variable rate loan may not use the word "fixed" in referring to the interest rate or payment unless there is an equally prominent statement of the time period for which the rate or payment is fixed. The rules also prohibit misrepresentations about government endorsement of the loan program and misleading claims of "debt elimination."
Requiring Earlier Cost Disclosures
With the increased complexity of today's mortgage products, consumers need to be well-informed shoppers. To assist consumers further, the Board amended Regulation Z to require that lenders provide consumers transaction-specific cost disclosures earlier in the application process, so that they can be used by consumers while shopping for a mortgage loan. Under the revised rules, creditors must provide a good faith estimate of the loan costs, including a payment schedule, within three days after the creditor receives the consumer's application. To ensure that consumers are able to use the information to shop, consumers cannot be charged any fee until after they receive the early disclosures, except a reasonable fee for obtaining the consumer's credit history. The rule applies to any home-secured loan, including home refinance loans and home-equity loans. Currently, early cost estimates are only required for home-purchase loans.
Last July, the Congress enacted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which codified the Board's new requirements for providing earlier TILA disclosures and also added some additional requirements, including a requirement that the estimated cost disclosures be provided at least seven days before the loan closing. This will enable consumers to review the transaction-specific disclosures when they have more time and are not confronted by a large number of other loan documents. In December 2008, the Board issued proposed rules to implement these additional changes and, with the recent close of the comment period, we expect the final rules to be issued in early spring.
The Board's Current Efforts to Improve Mortgage Disclosures
The Board recognizes the need to update TILA's cost disclosures for mortgage loans, to better reflect today's more complex products. Last year, we began using one-on-one interviews with consumers to test the current disclosures and potential revisions. We are well aware that consumers receive an overwhelming amount of information at the time they close a mortgage loan. The Truth in Lending disclosure, however, is a single-page form, and we are hopeful that the new requirements for providing this form earlier in the application process will distinguish the TILA disclosure from the many legal documents presented at loan closing as part of the credit contract or to satisfy state or local laws. However, the effectiveness of a disclosure is best judged through the results of consumer testing and not by the length of the disclosures alone.
Our goal is to improve the content and format of disclosures for both closed-end loans and home equity lines of credit in order to make mortgage disclosures more useful. The challenge is to strike a proper balance between providing information that is accurate and complete but not so complex as to create information overload. Testing model disclosures with real consumers is critical to the success of this effort.
In addition to our consumer testing, we are engaged in extensive outreach to obtain the views and suggestions of consumer advocates, industry representatives, and others. One concern that has been expressed over many years is the fact that consumers must receive separate disclosures under TILA and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), which is implemented by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This issue is not unfamiliar to us. In 1998, the Board and HUD submitted a joint report to the Congress containing recommendations for legislative reforms, including a requirement that a single model form be developed that creditors could use to comply with both TILA and RESPA. The joint report included a sample model form showing one approach to combining the disclosures.
Several years ago, HUD initiated efforts to revise the RESPA disclosures and the forms creditors use to provide a Good Faith Estimate (GFE) of settlement charges. Creditors must provide the GFE within three days after receiving a mortgage loan application, which is also the timing requirement for providing loan cost disclosures under TILA. HUD's efforts over the past several years have included testing its proposed disclosure forms with consumers and consulting with the Board's staff. We support the goals of HUD's efforts to make RESPA disclosures more accurate and more useful, and we commend HUD for using consumer testing to develop the new RESPA forms. However, we continue to believe that efforts should be made to develop a single form that creditors could use to satisfy the requirements of both TILA and RESPA.
In November 2008, HUD finalized its revised RESPA rules and mandated the use of a new three-page GFE form developed by HUD. As the Board moves forward in revising TILA's mortgage disclosures, we will continue to coordinate with HUD to avoid potential inconsistencies in the two disclosure schemes. We also remain ready to work with HUD in developing a combined disclosure form if HUD is willing to pursue this approach.
Legislative Responses
On November 15, 2007, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3915, the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, which takes a comprehensive approach to addressing mortgage lending problems while appropriately focusing on the practices that took place in the subprime mortgage market. We commend Congress' work on H.R. 3915, which informed the Board's rulemaking and represents a significant contribution to the public debate about these issues. The Board shares Congress' concerns with these practices, many of which are also addressed in the Board's recently adopted rules under HOEPA. As with regulations, it is important that any new laws carefully target abuses without unduly restraining responsible credit. Maintaining this balance is particularly important as many borrowers may need to refinance subprime loans into more affordable loans.
At this time, I will share briefly some observations about the bill. It should be noted that members of the Board's staff have previously discussed technical issues concerning the bill with congressional staff. We would be pleased to continue these discussions going forward if the Congress considers additional amendments to the bill.
As I stated earlier, H.R. 3915 would address many of the same concerns addressed in the Board's HOEPA rules. Although some of the details regarding implementation differ, H.R. 3915 and the Board's HOEPA rules both set minimum underwriting standards that are designed to ensure creditors verify and document borrowers' ability to repay higher-priced loans. H.R. 3915 would also provide consumer remedies for violations of the bill's minimum standards and consumers would be able to seek these remedies against creditors, assignees, and securitizers. As a general matter, the issue of appropriate remedies is one that is best left to the Congress. We note, however, that in order for assignee liability to create more market discipline, the laws must be clear about what acts or practices are prohibited so that assignees can perform due diligence and detect violations before purchasing the loans. Assignees may have difficulty in determining a creditor's compliance with a broad prohibition against making loans that do not provide a "net tangible benefit" unless that term is capable of being clearly defined in law or regulation.
H.R. 3915 also seeks to establish a federal duty of care that would apply to all mortgage originators, although the bill would not create a fiduciary relationship between the originator and the consumer. Loan originators would be required to present a range of loan products for which the consumer is likely to qualify, and which are appropriate for the consumer's current circumstances. The mortgage products presented to a consumer must be consistent with the consumer's ability to pay and provide a net tangible benefit. Because these standards are broad and originators would be liable for violations, we believe that the establishment of clearly defined safe harbors may be appropriate in implementing the law and that the statute should clarify that the rulewriting agency has sufficient flexibility for this purpose.
I would also like to say a few words about the bill's delegation of rulewriting responsibility. Since enactment of the Truth in Lending Act in 1968, the Federal Reserve has been the sole agency responsible for issuing rules to implement that Act. Several provisions of H.R. 3915 would amend TILA and would be implemented by regulations that are promulgated jointly by the federal banking agencies. On the one hand, interagency rulemakings ensure that different perspectives are considered in developing a rule and that all agencies have a say in the outcome. On the other hand, the interagency rulemaking process generally is a less efficient way to develop new regulations. Frequently, it can be challenging to achieve a consensus among the different agencies involved in an interagency rulemaking. As a result, interagency rulemakings can take considerably longer to complete than rulemakings that are assigned to a single agency.
Conclusion
The Federal Reserve is continuing its efforts to enhance consumer protection in the residential mortgage market. As we develop more useful consumer disclosures for both closed-end loans and home-equity lines, we are mindful that improved disclosure may not always be sufficient to address abuses. Accordingly, we will carefully consider whether additional substantive protections are needed to prevent unfair or deceptive practices. We look forward to working with the Congress to enhance consumer protections while promoting sustainable homeownership and
Thursday, March 5, 2009
Homeowner Affordability & Stability Plan
"Two weeks ago, the President laid out a clear path forward to helping up to nine million families restructure or refinance their mortgages to a payment that is affordable now and into the future. Today, we are providing servicers with the details they need to begin helping eligible borrowers," said Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner. "It is imperative that we continue to move with speed to help make housing more affordable and help arrest the damaging spiral in our housing markets, just as we work to stabilize our financial system, create jobs and help businesses thrive. Economic recovery requires action on all three fronts."
"Only two weeks after the President unveiled his plan to help promote homeowner affordability, we are moving forward today with these guidelines to implement that plan," HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan said. "This step forward represents a tremendous coordinated effort between major government and regulatory agencies to help bring relief to America's housing market and homeowners. This plan will help make home ownership more affordable for nine million American families and in doing so, help to stop the damaging impact that declining home prices have on all Americans."
The guidelines will implement financial incentives for mortgage lenders to modify existing first mortgages and set standard industry practice for modifications.
Treasury announced today that the Making Home Affordable program will also include additional incentives for efforts made to extinguish second liens on loans modified under this program. Extinguishing second liens will make mortgages more affordable, improve loan performance, and help prevent foreclosures.
In conjunction with the release of the new guidelines, Treasury, HUD and other members of a broad interagency task force have prepared consumer friendly Q&A and eligibility assessment tools for borrowers available at FinancialStability.gov. To ensure the program can be implemented as quickly as possible, the agencies also have conducted extensive outreach with housing counselors and mortgage servicers, including the development of call center phone scripts, a training plan and detailed guides, to prepare them for incoming inquiries from borrowers in the wake of the guidelines release. An expanded online resource will soon be available for borrowers, and agency representatives will fan out across the country in the coming weeks to conduct outreach at homeownership events in communities hardest hit by the housing crisis.
Homeowner Affordability & Stability Plan
"Two weeks ago, the President laid out a clear path forward to helping up to nine million families restructure or refinance their mortgages to a payment that is affordable now and into the future. Today, we are providing servicers with the details they need to begin helping eligible borrowers," said Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner. "It is imperative that we continue to move with speed to help make housing more affordable and help arrest the damaging spiral in our housing markets, just as we work to stabilize our financial system, create jobs and help businesses thrive. Economic recovery requires action on all three fronts."
"Only two weeks after the President unveiled his plan to help promote homeowner affordability, we are moving forward today with these guidelines to implement that plan," HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan said. "This step forward represents a tremendous coordinated effort between major government and regulatory agencies to help bring relief to America's housing market and homeowners. This plan will help make home ownership more affordable for nine million American families and in doing so, help to stop the damaging impact that declining home prices have on all Americans."
The guidelines will implement financial incentives for mortgage lenders to modify existing first mortgages and set standard industry practice for modifications.
Treasury announced today that the Making Home Affordable program will also include additional incentives for efforts made to extinguish second liens on loans modified under this program. Extinguishing second liens will make mortgages more affordable, improve loan performance, and help prevent foreclosures.
In conjunction with the release of the new guidelines, Treasury, HUD and other members of a broad interagency task force have prepared consumer friendly Q&A and eligibility assessment tools for borrowers available at FinancialStability.gov. To ensure the program can be implemented as quickly as possible, the agencies also have conducted extensive outreach with housing counselors and mortgage servicers, including the development of call center phone scripts, a training plan and detailed guides, to prepare them for incoming inquiries from borrowers in the wake of the guidelines release. An expanded online resource will soon be available for borrowers, and agency representatives will fan out across the country in the coming weeks to conduct outreach at homeownership events in communities hardest hit by the housing crisis.
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